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AND NEXT PLEASE? THE FUTURE OF 
THE NLW DEBATE 
 
Dr. Pauline M. Shanks Kaurin1 
  
Given the current face of emerging technologies in the 
media, and given the lack of prominence of stories and 
discourse about non-lethal weapons except in relation to 
domestic policing issues, one might wonder what direction the 
debate over non-lethal weapons as an emerging technology will 
take. This piece is designed to move along the conversation and 
think creatively and proactively about where the conversation 
needs to go. While non-lethal weapons have their own unique 
features, it is useful to frame the issues in terms of the 
questions and ethical problems that these emerging technologies 
raise, especially targeting, discrimination, and risk. Many of the 
same ethical issues also apply to other emerging technologies, 
framing a larger discourse about the future direction of war and 
the evolving ethical implications. 
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I. Introduction 
When reviewing the recent discourse on emerging technologies 
and warfare in the popular press, several things immediately come to 
the fore. First, there is the debate about the use of drones (Unmanned 
 
1. Dr. Pauline Shanks Kaurin holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Temple 
University, Philadelphia, and is a specialist in military ethics, just war 
theory, social and political philosophy and applied ethics. She is 
Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pacific Lutheran University in 
Tacoma, WA and teaches courses in military ethics, warfare, business 
ethics and history of philosophy. Her most recent book is ACHILLES 
GOES ASYMMETRICAL: THE WARRIOR, MILITARY ETHICS AND 
CONTEMPORARY WARFARE (2014). 
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Aerial Vehicles or UAVs) in the Global War on Terror, particularly in 
relation to the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki and others in 
Pakistan and Yemen.2 While targeted killing can be, and has been, 
conducted without drones,3 the use of UAV technology has sharply 
galvanized debate on the practice.4 Part of the reason for this 
sharpening may well be that such technology raises questions about 
the increasing automation of warfare, and the extent to which humans 
seem increasingly removed and remote in warfare. This physical and 
psychological removal of combatants from the battlefield increases the 
possibly of moving armed conflict toward full automation, raising 
serious implications for the morality and laws of war, not to mention 
the very nature of war itself. 
Second, there are increasing concerns about cyberwarfare, 
especially with regard to serious hacking threats from China5 and 
Iran,6 in addition to threats from non-State actors.7 In his discussion 
of asymmetric warfare, Rod Thornton notes that China has been 
quite explicit about its intention to use informational warfare, 
disrupting important infrastructure and informational systems, to 
cripple the U.S. military.8 Indeed, these threats are serious because it 
does not take a large threat in order to create a great effect.9 
Technology is absolutely integral to both the American Way of War 
and the American Way of Life. The dependency of both the U.S. 
 
2. Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOR. REL. (May 23, 
2013), http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. 
3. See id.  
4. See generally, Ben Lerner, UAVs and Force: Current Debates and 
Future Trends in Technology, Policy, and the Law, CTR. FOR SEC. 
POL’Y (Oct. 23, 2013), http:// www. centerforsecuritypolicy. org/ 2013/ 
10/21/lerner_uavs-and-force/.  
5. See WILLIAM HAGESTAD II, 21ST CENTURY CHINESE WARFARE 9–21 
(2012) (summarizing the cyberwar threat from official entities of the 
Chinese government).  
6. See generally, Iranian Cyber Threat to the U.S. Homeland: Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Counterterrorism and Intelligence and 
the Subcomm. On Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Prot., and Sec. Techs. 
of the Comm. On Homeland Sec. H.R., 112th Cong. (2012) (addressing 
the concerns of Congress related to potential digital attacks from Iran or 
allied non-state groups such as Hezbollah). 
7. See, e.g., McCaul Op-Ed: Hardening Our Defenses Against 
Cyberwarfare, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 6, 2013), http:// 
homeland.house.gov/news/mccaul-op-ed-hardening-our-defenses-against-
cyberwarfare-wall-street-journal.  
8. ROD THORNTON, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: THREAT AND RESPONSE IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 62–63 (2007). 
9. Id. at 63.  
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military and civilian infrastructure on technology highlights the 
vulnerability that such threats expose. 
Third, there are various groups—Hamas, Islamic State (IS), and 
al-Qaeda to name but a few—making extensive and effective use of 
social media for recruiting purposes, to get their message out, and to 
influence the actions of both state and non-state actors.10 Twitter, 
You Tube, Facebook, and other social media are the preferred 
platforms, and were used by both Israel and Hamas during the recent 
Gaza conflict,11 as well as by IS, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates to 
broadcast events like the execution of journalist James Foley.12 
Minority groups in Syria, Iraq, and various parts of Africa (such as 
Sudan, Congo, and Nigeria) have also used social media to bring 
attention to human rights abuses, such as potential or current ethnic 
cleansing and genocide, to influence public opinion, debate, and 
ultimately policy decisions at very high levels.13    
Given that this is the current face of emerging technologies in the 
media, and given the lack of prominence of stories and discourse 
about non-lethal weapons (NLW) except in relation to domestic 
policing issues, one might wonder what direction the debate over 
NLW as an emerging technology will take. This piece is designed to 
move along the conversation and think creatively and proactively 
about where the conversation needs to go. While NLW have their 
own unique features, it is useful to frame the issues in terms of the 
questions and ethical problems that these emerging technologies raise, 
especially targeting, discrimination, and risk. Many of the same 
ethical issues also apply to other emerging technologies, framing a 
larger discourse about the future direction of war and the evolving 
ethical implications. 
II. Non-Lethal Weapons as an Emerging Technology 
A core element of the debate surrounding NLW as an emerging 
technology is whether NLW still qualify as an emerging technology or 
 
10. See, e.g. Jillian Kay Melchior, ISIS Tactics Illustrate Social Media’s 
New Place In Modern War, TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 18, 2014), 
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/isis-tactics-illustrate-
social-media%E2%80%99s-new-place-in-modern-war/ar-BB9gH4R.  
11. See, e.g. Jodi Rudorin, In Gaza, Epithets Are Fired and Euphemisms 
Give Shelter, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2014), http:// www. nytimes. 
com/2014/07/21/world/middleeast/in-a-clash-between-israel-and-gaza-
both-sides-use-social-media-to-fire-epithets-and-hide-behind-
euphemisms.html.  
12. See Melchior, supra note 9. 
13. See Global Agenda Councils: Emerging Technologies, WORLD ECON. 
FORUM, http:// reports. weforum.org/ global-agenda-council-2012/ 
councils/emerging-technologies/ (last accessed Mar. 23, 2015).  
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if they have passed into the realm of existing technologies. According 
to the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, “Emerging 
Technologies are ones that: arise from new knowledge of the 
innovative application of existing knowledge; lead to the rapid 
development of new capabilities; are projected to have systemic and 
long lasting economic, social and political impacts; create new 
opportunities for and challenges to addressing global issues and have 
the potential to disrupt or create entire industries.”14 While this 
definition is not perfect, it addresses an essential point that there is 
something transformative and potentially radical about the 
technology relative to other technologies that are already present and 
in use. 
NLW have been used in various combat contexts since at least 
the 1990s. Beginning with Somalia15 and the former Yugoslavia,16 
commanders requested NLW to address asymmetric armed conflict 
situations that presented significant risks to civilian populations, such 
as peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions, counterinsurgencies. 
Commanders also requested NLW for use in conflicts where political 
limits on combat action made having multiple levels and kinds of 
force available essential to a successful mission, such as in Iraq in the 
mid-2000s.17 The question of what exactly constitutes a NLW is 
complicated, but, generally, NLWs are not intended to kill, 
permanently injure, or maim; rather, any effects are intended to be 
temporary, minor, and reversible.18 While some kinds of NLW have 
been in existence for quite some time, the current generation of NLW 
was first tactically employed by U.S. Marines in Somalia in the 
1990s.19 The U.S. Directorate on Non-Lethal Weapons was established 
in 1996 to head up efforts by the Department of Defense to develop, 
evaluate, and employ NLW in U.S. military operations.20 At the 
present time, NLW include low-impact bullets, foams, nets, lights, 
noise, and gas grenades. Currently in development and testing are a 
variety of other kinds of weapons, including: directed energy systems; 
 
14. Mike Treder, The Definition of Emerging Technologies, INST. FOR 
ETHICS & EMERGING TECHS. (Dec. 6, 2010), http:// ieet.org/ 
index.php/Ieet/more/treder20101206. 
15. Pauline Kaurin, With Fear and Trembling: An Ethical Framework for 
Non-Lethal Weapons, J. MIL. ETHICS 100, 102 (2010).  
16. See Linda D. Kozaryn, U.S. Troops in Bosnia Get Nonlethal Weapons, 
U.S. DEF. DEP’T (Sept. 5, 1997), http:// www. defense. gov/ news/ 
newsarticle.aspx?id=41128.  
17. PAULINE KAURIN, THE WARRIOR, MILITARY ETHICS AND CONTEMPORARY 
WARFARE: ACHILLES GOES ASYMMETRIC (2014).  
18. See Kaurin, With Fear and Trembling, supra note 14, at 102. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
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lasers; electromagnetic power to degrade equipment; light weapons; 
sticky foams; pheromones; and vinyl nets deployed by mines capable 
of stopping vehicles.21  There is also progress on systems that can 
disable or neutralize vehicles, optical distracters, focused acoustics, 
Active Denial Technology (ADT), and laser induced plasmas.22  
The aim of all of these weapons is to provide increased flexibility 
and response time on the part of military personnel, and to find ways 
to neutralize a battlefield threat without having to resort to lethal or 
less-than-lethal force. Advocates of NLW highlight their benefits in 
environments like Iraq, which presented the following kinds of 
situations: military units operating in urban or mixed areas where it 
was not clear which individuals were combatants and which were non-
combatants; at vehicle checkpoints where it was advisable to be able 
to assess the intent of individuals and vehicles from a safe distance, 
given the prevalence of IED and suicide bombing tactics; and in areas 
where one wanted to lessen the impact of war on non-combatants to 
help “win hearts and minds” so as to facilitate the restoration of 
peace and foster long-term stability in the region.23 
Given the history and relatively slow development of NLW, with 
limited funds and more limited political visibility than other 
technologies, it seems that there are other technologies that better 
qualify as emerging. This is especially true of long-lasting impacts and 
new opportunities for impact on global issues if we think about how 
these three technologies have driven public debate and policy concerns 
over the last couple years. In the 1990s, NLWs were clearly emerging 
in the sense of the definition above and were recognized as having, 
potentially, a fairly radical effect on non-traditional military contexts 
(peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and counter-insurgency). 
During this period, the debates on NLW were significant and publicly 
visible, with a few even raising the specter of the NLW as a substitute 
for lethal force, constituting a possible revolution in military affairs.24 
However, the Department of Defense policy that emerged in the late 
1990s clearly set strict parameters on their use and made clear they 
were an augment to, and not a substitute for, lethal force, thus 
maintaining the lethal force combat paradigm with an emphasis on 
benefits for force protection.25 
 
21. Id.at 102–03. 
22. Id. at 103.  
23. Id. 
24. Steven Metz, Non-Lethal Weapons, A Progress Report, JOINT FORCE Q., 
Spring/Summer 2001, at 18, 19.  
25. See LT. COL. TIMOTHY J. LAMB (USA), EMERGING NON-LETHAL 
WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR 21ST 
CENTURY WARFARE 7 (1996). 
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What is emerging about NLW, however, is the way in which they 
have shaped the discourse around ethics and war in ways that also 
apply strongly to other emerging technologies. First, NLW highlight 
the risk averse and zero-casualty nature of contemporary, warfare, 
especially asymmetric warfare. Second, they raise many of the same 
issues found with other emerging combat technologies, especially in 
terms of targeting and discrimination of non-combatants. Third, NLW 
are emerging technologies in the sense that they can challenge and 
change the standard military doctrine, lethal-combat-oriented force as 
the dominant mode of war, requiring a rethinking role of lethality in 
war. 
III. Ethical Ramifications of the Use of Non-Lethal 
Weapons on the Battlefield 
In order to grapple with NLW as an emerging technology, it is 
necessary to examine the following issues,: targeting the legitimate 
object of war; discrimination between combatants and non-
combatants; the level of risk necessary for war to be ethical, especially 
on the part of combatants;  the impact of these weapons on both 
combatants and non-combatants; and  the long term collateral 
damage and impact of these technologies, aside from the 
considerations of proportionality in the previous issue. These 
particular issues need to be addressed because the principal arguments 
leveled by proponents of NLW is that they do less harm, and that 
any harm they do cause is more likely to be temporary and reversible, 
especially relative to non-combatants, than the lethality paradigm. 
However, this line of argument about mitigating and reducing harm, 
like those about UAVs and targeted killing, is based primarily on 
utilitarian considerations of effect and impact, which mask more 
critical issues like targeting and risk. These two considerations, and 
the shifts in ethical thinking they represent, do intersect with the 
issues raised by targeted killing, UAVs, and the use of social media in 
war because they circumvent the traditional combatant-oriented, 
physical force/combat-based notion of war as circumscribed by jus in 
bello and international law. 
A. Targeting 
The question of whom to target is a central factor regarding NLW 
as an emerging technology. Some arguments suggest that because 
NLW are non-lethal, then a force using NLW ought to be able to 
target non-combatants since the harm is much less than that from 
lethal weapons, and may be reversible. Unfortunately, this argument 
confuses the issues of effect and discrimination, as Chris Mayer and 
other have rightly indicated..26 When one targets non-combatants,  
26. See Kaurin, With Fear and Trembling, supra note 14, at 105.  
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one: violates their rights; treats them as objects of war, to which they 
have not consented; and violates the requirements under the law of 
armed conflict for discrimination (discussed infra) and non-combatant 
immunity. Therefore, the intentional targeting of non-combatants, 
regardless of how minor the resulting harm might be, is radically 
problematic to any ethical and humane conception of war. Being 
treated as an object of war is itself a very serious harm. 
It may also be problematic to target combatants with weaponry 
against which they would not have a reasonable chance of making a 
response or mounting a defense. In particular, certain chemical and 
other non-ballistic weapons are designed to blind the victim, effect the 
victim’s nervous system, or alter the victim’s consciousness to 
compromise the victim’s ability to function and defend themselves.27  
This is not to say that symmetry of weaponry is required, but the 
rules of war and international law have, for good reason, placed 
restrictions on what kinds of weapons and tactics can be used; in 
particular, they bar anything that causes unnecessary suffering or 
compromises human dignity.28  A combatant is still a human being 
and ethical warfare requires recognition of this fact. 
Noting these points, targeting objects and infrastructure with 
NLW that would otherwise be legitimate targets of lethal force seems 
much less problematic. Indeed, targeting with NLW might be more 
desirable, as it would render these objects unusable only in the short 
term, while avoiding the kind of long-term destruction that makes the 
restoration of peace and jus post bellum considerations so difficult. 
This kind of approach truly can challenge the destruction–as-lethality 
paradigm of warfare (if one can think about destroying a bridge as 
killing it), transforming the nature of warfare and strongly impacting 
global issues.  
B. Discrimination 
The questions about targeting return us to the question on how 
forces are supposed to discriminate and between combatants and non-
combatants. This question is especially problematic in fluid situations 
and where distance is an issue, as NLW (like UAV) are designed to 
increase distance between combatants and those they are 
encountering. As noted earlier, those arguments in favor of NLW by 
insisting that NLW render discrimination moot are morally 
problematic. Discrimination must be maintained regardless of how 
minor the harm or impact is. 
 
27. See Current Non-Lethal Weapons, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 
PROGRAM, http://jnlwp.defense.gov/CurrentNonLethalWeapons.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2015).  
28. See Kaurin, supra note 14, at 102, 106.  
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If discrimination is to remain as an element of the use of NLW, 
then the analysis of discrimination must focus on the basis upon 
which it is to occur. Recently, Jeff McMahan and other revisionists 
have made arguments undermining the basis of the Moral Equality of 
Combatants argument. They argue that not all combatants are 
ethically equal; rather, that some combatants are unjust and therefore 
are subject to force, whereas just combatants are not.29 This argument 
has thus far been applied only to combatants, but it seems that it also 
has rippling implications for non-combatants and, in particular, the 
protections of non-combatant immunity. Under this theory, there may 
be unjust non-combatants that one might argue ought to be targeted 
in virtue of their “unjust” cause. Just as with the arguments against 
the moral equality of combatants, such arguments face serious 
epistemological hurdles and involve shifting the basis of discrimination 
to guilt and innocence relative to the cause of the war, as opposed to 
consent, threat, or membership in a protected category.30 To say that 
such a move is problematic and controversial is to dramatically 
understate the case. 
Implementing discrimination on the ground still has its practical 
problems, even after clarifying the basis of the discrimination.  Much 
like drones, NLW increase the size of the battlefield, making 
discrimination determinations more difficult and complicated than 
those determinations made in conventional combat. Therefore, these 
emerging technologies actually make discrimination more important 
and complicated, not less, and users of NLW must carefully address 
the discrimination concerns going forward. 
C. Risk 
Underlying the concerns regarding targeting and discrimination is 
the critical question of risk distribution, relative to both force 
protection for combatants and to risk imposed upon non-combatants 
While risk is omnipresent in armed conflict, what is less clear is 
whether there is a minimum level of risk that combatants have a 
moral obligation to bear in war, and what the moral status of conflict 
activities is in non-war situations. 
While reasonable force protection is a legitimate concern, forces 
encounter a serious moral problem that speaks directly to the nature 
of war when the impetus to force protection is motivated by a zero 
casualty mentality and pressure for the bloodless war. War is different 
from massacre and the crime of murder in important ways having to 
 
29. See Jeff McMahan, On the Moral Equality of Combatants, 14 J. POL. 
PHIL. 377, 379 (2006). 
30. See id. at 383–84 (detailing the debate between implied consent due to 
the circumstance of war and the actual consent by just or unjust 
combatants to be engaged in war). 
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do with the risk the combatants take, the danger that they are 
expected to endure in return for wielding lethal force (largely without 
sanction provided it is within certain parameters), and the protections 
afforded non-combatants who are not subject to the same risks and do 
not have the same tools to defend themselves.31  
There is a moral argument to be made for keeping death and 
injury to the absolute minimum necessary for the military objective 
(which accords with the Proportionality of Means principle in the 
Just War Tradition), but—and this is a large caveat—if this is 
achieved by transferring or increasing the risk to non-combatants, the 
moral claim cannot be justified. Once again, non-combatants have not 
consented to be objects of war. To put non-combatants at increased 
risk is to treat them as objects of war, which ultimately erodes non-
combatant immunity. Combatants, on the other hand, are objects of 
war and have consented to (or at least acknowledge) that they are 
under lethal threat and can, and will, be targeted, which is why they 
have weapons and the right to return this lethal force. This risk 
comes with combatancy and war. 
D. Impact 
The impact of NLW in armed conflict is the final and most visible 
element of the NLW analysis, and must occur after addressing the 
earlier issues of targeting, discrimination, and risk. Much of the 
discussion and debate surrounding NLW focuses on the impact of 
non-combatants and the potential that NLW have to be less harmful, 
in particular to reduce collateral damage by giving the military more 
options than lethal force and ways to de-escalate situations so as not 
to lead to lethal force. While NLW clearly can do some harm, if they 
do less net harm than conventional weaponry, it seems that the 
discourse around collateral damage and the Doctrine of Double 
Effect32 would support their use because it would reduce the amount 
and impact of any unintentional harm to non-combatants. That said, 
there are serious questions about how to measure and assess the 
impacts of NLW. Testing on humans is problematic, and individuals 
with distinct characteristics of health, age, gender, and body type 
seem to react differently to the same agent or weapon, which makes 
assessing the potential harm resulting from NLW use more difficult 
than with lethal force. 
The impact of NLW on combatants remains a serious issue, 
especially to consider whether NLW are more humane and cause less, 
or more, reversible kinds of harm than conventional lethal weapons. If 
 
31. Kaurin, supra note 14, at 108.  
32. Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL’Y 
(Winter 2014), http:// plato. stanford. edu/ archives/ win2014/ 
entries/double-effect/. 
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there are weapons that actually cause more harm (especially in terms 
of proportionality of means33), this is seriously problematic. This is to 
some degree analogous to the debate about the use of UAV possibly 
putting ground troops at more risk, or generating more resistance 
from the adversary on the ground, because of how these weapons 
impact the perception adversaries have of their opponents’ courage 
and willingness to sacrifice for their cause.34 Even if these technologies 
seems to save lives in the short term, they may be problematic in 
other, more long-term and big-picture, ways that change how to think 
about the impact of these weapons. 
E. Long-Term Collateral Damage 
Finally, it is critical to think through the long-term, unintended 
consequences for the use of these weapons that fall outside the 
calculations related to above-mentioned collateral damage, especially 
in terms of jus post bellum considerations. What are the long-term 
impacts for jus post bellum if all sides make use of these weapons, as 
often happens since emerging technologies rarely remain the domain 
of only one party for long? How does the use of these technologies 
inform the perception that non-combatants have of the involved 
parties, and what is the impact on the restoration of peace after the 
combat concludes? There are clear parallels between the UAV and 
targeting killing debates and the consideration of winning hearts and 
minds, in terms of perceptions of the nation using UAV, risk aversion, 
and also providing recruitment and resistance for the adversary., That 
adversary can make the argument that a state using UAV is 
cowardly, will not fight, and only needs to endure a conflict long 
enough to be victorious.35   Even if NLWs cause less harm and seem 
more humane in the short term, long-term and jus post bellum 
considerations may ultimately suggest such emerging technologies are 
not the best, most ethical choice. 
IV. Conclusion 
From the discussion of these issues, NLWs are an emerging 
technology, not so much in the sense of the technology itself, but 
more in the nature of the ethical challenges and the power of how 
society answers or addresses those challenges to have the kinds of 
transformative and disruptive impacts alluded to in the definition of 
 
33. Kaurin, supra, note 14 at 101.  
34. Christian Enemark, The End of Courage? How Drones Are 
Undermining Military Virtue, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/04/24/3744693.htm.  
35. Id. 
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NLW supra.36 While the focus on targeting and discrimination does 
not really change or disrupt the lethality paradigm, or the moral 
requirements presumed to go with it, the discussions of risk, short-
term impact, and long term impact have the potential to challenge 
that paradigm, at least to the degree that states think of lethality 
being the ultimate determiner of victory in warfare. 
Like UAVs, cyberwar, and social media, NLWs raise questions 
about how close to the battlefield one has to be in order to be 
engaged in the conflict, as well as how society is to think about the 
categories of combatant and non-combatant. All these technologies 
also give the individual, as opposed to a conventional military unit, 
more ability to escalate, de-escalate, and manage situations that can 
lead to conflict, undermining the idea that war and success in war are 
necessarily tied to physical combat and battle. To the degree that 
NLWs and other emerging technologies raise issues that challenge this 
picture of the nature of war and how it is fought, they have 
tremendous potential to impact and challenge how society addresses 
global issues of conflict, disrupt the defense industry with its focus on 
combat and lethal force, and cause rethinking of the role of warfare as 
a means of political action. But this conversation has only begun, and 
there is much left to be said. 
 
 
36. See Treder, supra note 13. 
  
